Abstract. In the computational social choice literature, there has been great interest in understanding how computational complexity can act as a barrier against manipulation of elections. Much of this literature, however, makes the assumption that the voters or agents specify a complete preference ordering over the set of candidates. There are many multiagent systems applications, and even real-world elections, where this assumption is not warranted, and this in turn raises the question "How hard is it to manipulate elections if the agents reveal only partial preference orderings?". It is this question that we study in this paper. In particular, we look at the weighted manipulation problem -both constructive and destructive manipulation -when such partial voting is allowed and when there are only a bounded number of candidates. We study the exact number of candidates that are required to make manipulation hard for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as Copeland α , and for the maximin protocol.
Introduction
Preference aggregation is an important problem in multiagent settings as there are many scenarios where a group of agents has to make a common decision. The process of arriving at this decision, in turn, has to accommodate the needs and preferences of all the participating agents. A natural, and commonly used, mechanism to achieve this is voting, where all the agents specify their preferences and a previously agreed-upon procedure -called the election system or voting protocol -is used to arrive at the decision. Although voting is a useful and widely used mechanism, it is not without its problems. One particular issue that arises is manipulation or strategic voting by the agents who, by misreporting their true preferences, may attempt to sway the outcome of the election in their favor. A goal of a recent body of literature has been to understand if and when computational complexity can be used as a barrier against strategic voting (for e.g. [1] , [4] , [6] ).
A common assumption in much of the research in computational social choice is that the agents fully specify their preferences by providing a complete preference ordering over all the candidates or alternatives. However, there are many practical situations where the agents may not be able to determine a complete ranking over all the candidates or even if they can specify a complete ranking, the voting rule used may not insist that one be provided. Thus, it is important to understand the repercussions of having partial votes in general.
There has been some work in this domain. For example, Xia and Conitzer looked at the problem of determining possible and necessary winners when partial votes were allowed [12] , while Lu and Boutilier looked at the multi-winner problem when only partial votes were provided [8] . When it comes to manipulation with partial votes, Narodytska and Walsh recently provided an analysis of constructive manipulation (for both weighted and unweighted voters) for three particular voting protocols: Borda, STV, and the Copeland rule [9] . In this paper, we continue this line of research by looking at broader classes of voting rules, considering both constructive and destructive manipulation in weighted elections where there are only a bounded number of candidates. In doing so, we characterize the exact number of candidates that are required to make manipulation hard for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as Copeland α , and for the maximin protocol.
Preliminaries
We model an election as a pair E = (C, V ), where C = {c 1 , · · · , c m } is the set of candidates and V = {v 1 , · · · , v n } is the set of voters. Each voter v i has a preference order O i on C. O i is said to be a complete order (or a complete vote) when it is antisymmetric, transitive, and a total ordering on C. In this paper we also consider partial orders (or partial votes), meaning that O i can be a linear order over any non-empty subset of C. For example, consider an election scenario with C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. A voter v i who prefers c 2 the best and dislikes c 1 the most has a complete ordering O i which is represented by (c 2 ≻ c 3 ≻ c 1 ) or sometimes simply (c 2 , c 3 , c 1 ), while another voter v j who likes c 3 but has no opinion on c 1 and c 2 has a partial ordering O j given by (c 3 ). A preference profile is a vector P = O 1 , · · · , O n of individual preferences. Since this paper considers weighted manipulation, additionally every voter v i has a non-negative integer weight w i associated with them.
Voting Protocols
A voting protocol is a function defined from the set of all preference profiles to the set of candidates C. The following are the commonly-studied voting rules that we consider in this paper. For each of them, we first define them on complete orderings and then talk about how the evaluations are done when there are partial orders.
1. Positional scoring rules: A positional scoring rule is defined by a scoring vector α = α 1 , · · · , α m , where α 1 ≥ · · · ≥ α m . For each voter v, a candidate receives α i points if it is ranked in the ith position by v. In a scoring rule, the candidate with highest total score s i is the winner. Some examples of scoring rules are the plurality rule with α = 1, 0, · · · , 0 , the Borda rule with α = m − 1, m − 2, · · · , 0 , and the veto rule with α = 1, · · · , 1, 0 .
To deal with partial votes where a voter ranks only k out of the m candidates, we consider the following three schemes that were used by Narodytska and Walsh in their preliminary work on manipulation with partial preferences [9] . As we will show in the results, the choice of evaluation scheme does have an impact on the hardness of manipulation. . For any positional scoring rule X, we denote this by X av . 2. Scoring elimination rules: Let X be any scoring rule. Given a total ordering, eliminate(X) is the rule that successively eliminates the candidate placed in the last place by X. Some examples of scoring elimination rules are the Single Transferable Vote (STV) which is basically eliminate(plurality) and the Baldwin's rule which is eliminate(Borda).
In scoring elimination rules, we deal with partial votes by using a method given by Narodytska and Walsh which is analogous to rounding up for scoring rules [9] . Here, we consider a partial vote to be valid only until at least one of the candidates listed in it is remaining in the election. In other words, we simply ignore a partial vote once all the candidates listed in it are eliminated. 3. Plurality with runoff: The plurality with runoff rule proceeds in two steps.
In the first step, all the candidates except the top two with the most number of first votes are eliminated. This is followed by a transfer of votes to the second round where the winner is determined using the majority rule. Partial votes here are dealt in the same way as they are done for scoring elimination rules. 4. Copeland α : Faliszewski et al. [5] introduced a family of election systems known as Copeland α by introducing a parameter α (α ∈ Q, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1) that essentially describes the value of a tie. In Copeland α , for each pair of candidates, the candidate preferred by the majority receives one point and the other one receives a 0. In case of a tie, both receive α points. The winner in a Copeland α election is one with the highest score. Usually when papers use the Copeland rule they essentially mean Copeland 0.5 which was the original rule proposed by Copeland. Here, to deal with partial votes we assume that the unranked candidates are all tied at the last place. 5. Maximin: Let N P (c i , c j ) denote the number of voters who prefer c i over c j in the preference profile P . Then the maximin score of c i is s i = min j =i N P (c i , c j ). The winner in the maximin rule is the one with the highest score.
Here again we deal with partial votes by assuming that the unranked candidates are all tied at the last place.
Manipulation
In this paper, we consider two kinds of manipulation: constructive manipulation and destructive manipulation. Broadly, the goal in the former is to make a preferred candidate win, while in the latter it is to ensure that a certain disliked candidate does not win. More formally, we consider constructive weighted coalitional manipulation and destructive weighted coalitional manipulation.
Constructive Weighted Coalitional Manipulation (CWCM) ([3]) :
In CWCM, given a set of weighted votes S (votes of the non-manipulators), the weights for a set of votes T (manipulators' votes), and a preferred candidate p, we are asked if there exists a way to cast the votes in T so that p wins the election.
Destructive Weighted Coalitional Manipulation (DWCM) ([3]) :
In DWCM, given a set of weighted votes S (votes of the non-manipulators), the weights for a set of votes T (manipulators' votes), and a disliked candidate h, we are asked if there exists a way to cast the votes in T so that h does not win the election.
In many instances it might so be the case that a tie-breaking is required to obtain a unique winner. In this paper, like is usually done in literature, we assume that the ties are broken in favor of the manipulators.
Constructive Manipulation
In most of the proofs for NP-hardness in this section we use reductions from either the Partition problem or from a variant of the subset sum problem which we call as Fixed-Difference Subset Sum.
Definition 1 (Partition).
Given a set of non-negative integers S = {k i } 1≤i≤t summing to 2K, we are asked if there exists a subset S 1 which sums to K.
Definition 2 (Fixed-Difference Subset Sum). Given a set of non-negative integers S = {k i } 1≤i≤t summing to 2K, we are asked if there exists two subsets S 1 , S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K, where S i denotes the sum of all the elements in the set S i .
Scoring Rules
Theorem 1. For any positional scoring rule X, computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate X ↑ with weighted partial votes takes polynomial time (for any number of candidates).
Proof. The manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for p alone will make it win. If not, they cannot make p win.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 2. For the plurality and veto protocol, computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate plurality ↓ or veto ↓ with weighted partial votes takes polynomial time (for any number of candidates).
Proof. For the veto protocol, the manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for p alone will make it win. If not, they cannot make p win. In case of plurality, they can check if all of them placing p at the top and all the other candidates in arbitrary order can make p win.
⊓ ⊔ Theorem 3. For any positional scoring protocol X that is not isomorphic to plurality or veto, CWCM with partial votes in X ↓ is NP-complete for three candidates.
Proof. Since there are only three candidates, the scoring vector for the corresponding positional scoring rule is defined by α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , where α 1 > α 2 > α 3 = 0 (because α 1 = α 2 is isomorphic to veto, α 2 = α 3 is isomorphic to plurality, and α 3 can be taken to be zero since translating the scores in a scoring rule does not affect the outcome of the rule). Also, note that if the three candidates are p, a, and b, each manipulator votes in one of the following ways:
1 -where for (p) candidate p gets a score α 2 , and for (p, a|b) candidate p gets α 1 and a|b gets α 2 .
The problem is in NP since winner determination for any scoring rule can be done in polynomial time. To show NP-hardness, we proceed by considering three
For the first two cases, we reduce an arbitrary instance of the Partition problem to an instance of CWCM, and for the third case we show a reduction from the Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem.
Consider the following instance of CWCM, where p, a, and b are the three candidates. In S, let there be (2α 1 − α 2 )K voters voting for (a, b, p) and (b, a, p) each. As a result, a and b have a score of (
Suppose there exists a partition. Let those manipulators in one partition vote (p, a) and those in the other vote (p, b). Then the score of p, a and b, is α 1 (α 1 + α 2 )2K. Now, since all the three have the same score, p wins by tiebreaking.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. Let x, y, and z be the sum of the k i 's of the manipulators in T who vote (p, a), (p, b), and (p), respectively. So now, the score of p is ((x + y)α 1 + zα 2 )(α 1 + α 2 ), while that of a and b is ((2α 1 − α 2 )K + xα 2 )(α 1 + α 2 ) and ((2α 1 − α 2 )K + yα 2 )(α 1 + α 2 ), respectively. Since there exists a successful manipulation, score of p should be at least as large as that of a, and so we have ((x + y)
. Using the fact that x + y + z = 2K, this simplifies to (K − x)α 2 ≥ z(α 1 − α 2 ) (1). Again, the score of p should be at least as large as that of b, so we have (K − y)α 2 ≥ z(α 1 − α 2 ) (2). Adding (1) and (2) and simplifying it, we have z(2α 1 − 3α 2 ) ≤ 0. Now, since we assumed α 1 > 3 2 α 2 , this implies that z ≤ 0. But z cannot be less than 0, so it has to be equal to 0. Plugging z = 0 in (1) and (2), we have x ≤ K and y ≤ K respectively. This together with the fact that x+ y + z = 2K implies that x = y = K, and therefore there exists a partition.
Consider the following instance of CWCM. In S, let there be K voters voting for (a, b, p), K voters voting for (b, a, p), and K voters voting for (a) and (p) each. As a result, the scores of a, b, and p are (α 1 + α 2 )K + α 2 K, (α 1 + α 2 )K, and α 2 K respectively. In T , let each k i have a vote of weight k i .
Suppose there exists a partition. Let those manipulators in one partition vote (p, b) and those in the other vote (p). Then the score of all the three candidates is α 1 K +2α 2 K. Now, since all the three have the same score, p wins by tie-breaking.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. Let x, y, and z be the total weight of manipulators in T who vote (p, a), (p, b), and (p) respectively. So now, the score of p is (x + y)α 1 + zα 2 + α 2 K, while that of a and b is (α 1 + α 2 )K + α 2 K + xα 2 and (α 1 + α 2 )K + yα 2 respectively. Since there exists a successful manipulation, score of p should be at least as large as that of a, and so we have (x + y)
Using the fact that x + y + z = 2K, this simplifies to (α 1 − α 2 )K − xα 2 ≥ z(α 1 − α 2 ) (1). Again, the score of p should be at least as large as that of b, so we have
. Adding (1) and (2) and simplifying it, we have (K − z)(2α 1 − 3α 2 ) ≥ 0. Now, since we assumed (1) and (2), we have x ≤ 0, and y ≤ K, respectively. But then x cannot be less than 0, so it has to be equal to 0, and this in turn results in z ≤ K in (1). But again, z cannot not be both greater than and lesser than equal to K. So, z has to be equal to K, and since x + y + z = 2K, y = K. This implies there exists a partition.
iii) α 1 = 
⊓ ⊔
Theorem 4.
Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate plurality av with weighted partial votes takes polynomial time (for any number of candidates).
Proof. The manipulators can simply check if all of them voting for p alone will make it win. If not, they cannot make p win. ⊓ ⊔ Theorem 5. For any positional scoring protocol X that is not isomorphic to plurality, CWCM with partial votes in X av is NP-complete for three candidates.
We prove this by using a reduction from the Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem. The detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
Scoring Elimination Rules
Theorem 6. Partial voting does not encourage more strategic voting in eliminate(Veto).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary set W of partial votes which -along with the set S of non-manipulators' votes -results in an elimination order e = (c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c m = p), where p is the preferred candidate, and c i is the candidate eliminated in the ith round. Now, consider the set of votes X such that each vote in W is replaced by p = c m ≻ c m−1 ≻ · · · ≻ c 1 . X along with S results in the same elimination order e. Therefore, we see that any manipulation that can be achieved by a set of partial votes can be achieved by casting an equivalent set of complete votes. Hence, partial voting does not affect the complexity of manipulation in the worst case.
⊓ ⊔
Since partial voting does not encourage more strategic voting, it follows that for bounded (or even unbounded) number of candidates we can use the same result as that for the complete votes case [2] .
Corollary 1.
Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate eliminate(Veto) with weighted partial votes takes polynomial time for bounded number of candidates.
We next consider elimination versions of scoring rules in general and show that CWCM with partial votes for m ≥ 3 candidates is NP-complete for elimination version of any scoring rule that is not isomorphic to veto. For this, we employ the same approach as in [2] -which proved the result for complete votesand first show that partial voting does not change the complexity of Anti-WCM for any scoring rule. Subsequently, we use this result and an identical reduction as in [2] to prove our main result.
Definition 3 (Anti-WCM [2])
. Given a set S of weighted votes, the weights for a set of votes T , and a disliked candidate d, we are asked if there exists a way to cast the votes in T so that it results in d receiving the lowest score.
Theorem 7. Partial voting does not change the worst-case complexity of Anti-WCM for any scoring protocol.
The proof can be found in the appendix. Theorem 8. For any scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to veto, CWCM with partial votes in eliminate(X) is NP-complete for three candidates.
Proof. From Corollary 2 we know that Anti-WCM with partial votes is NPcomplete for any scoring rule that is not isomorphic to veto. Therefore we can use the exact same technique as in [2, Theorem 13] where they use a reduction from an arbitrary instance of Anti-WCM to prove the above result for the case of complete votes. ⊓ ⊔ Corollary 3. For the plurality with runoff rule, CWCM with partial votes is NP-complete for three candidates since for three candidates the plurality with runoff rule is the same as STV. is NP-complete for four candidates [9] . Additionally, they also conjectured that the result holds when the number of candidates is three. Here we prove that conjecture, and also show that our hardness result holds for all rational α ∈ [0, 1).
Copeland
Theorem 9. Let α be a rational number with 0 ≤ α < 1. For Copeland α , CWCM with partial votes is NP-complete for three candidates.
Proof. It is easy to show that the problem is in NP. To show that it is NP-hard, we use a reduction from an arbitrary instance of Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem. Let p, a, and b be the three candidates. In S, let there be 3K voters  voting for (a, b, p) and K voting for (b, a, p) . In T , let each k i have a vote of weight 2k i .
Suppose there exists S 1 , S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K. In Copeland α , it can be assumed that all the manipulators rank p first. So, let the manipulators in S 1 vote (p, b) 2 , those in S 2 vote (p, a) 2 , and let the rest vote for (p). If N V (r, s) denotes the total number of votes in V which rank r prior to s, then N S∪T (p, a) = 0 and N S∪T (p, b) = 0. Therefore, the score of p, s(p) = 2α. Also since while N S (a, b) = 2K. Therefore, N S∪T (a, b) = 0 and so, both receive a score 2α. As a result, p wins by tie-breaking.
Conversely, suppose there exists a successful manipulation in favor of p. If x, y, and z, denote the sum of k i 's of the manipulators in T who vote (p, a), (p, b), and (p), respectively, then without taking into account the pairwise election between a and b in T , the score of p, a, and b is 2α, 1 + α, and α, respectively. Now since 2α < 1 + α for all rational α ∈ [0, 1), therefore, the only way p would win this is if including the pairwise election between a and b in T results in a tie between them. So this implies that N S∪T (a, b) = 2K + 2x − 2y is equal to N S∪T (b, a) = −2K + 2y − 2x. Equating both results in y − x = K, and this in turn implies that there exists sets S 1 and S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K, where y = S 1 and x = S 2 .
Maximin
Theorem 10. Computing if a coalition of manipulators can manipulate the maximin protocol with weighted partial votes takes polynomial time (for any number of candidates).
To prove this, we show that any constructive manipulation achieved for p can be achieved if all manipulators just vote (p). The detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
The above theorem shows that partial voting has a huge impact on constructive manipulation in the maximin rule, especially since constructive manipulation here is known to be NP-complete for four candidates when we consider only complete votes [3, Theorem 8] 3 .
Destructive Manipulation
Theorem 11. For any voting rule that is monotone and is based on numerical scores, partial voting has no impact on destructive manipulation.
Proof. Consider a voting rule X that is monotone and is based on numerical scores. Let the destructive manipulation be against the candidate h. Now, suppose there exists an arbitrary set of partial votes W that -along with the set S of non-manipulators' votes -results in the destructive manipulation of h in X. Since X is based on scores we will have a final ordering of the candidates after the election. Let e : c 1 ( = h) ≻ c 2 ≻ · · · ≻ c m denote that ordering. Next, consider the set of votes W ′ which is formed by completing the votes in W in the following way: replace each vote in W by placing c 1 at the top, h at the bottom (i.e. in the mth position), and the rest of the candidates in any arbitrary order. Since X is monotone, W ′ along with S cannot result in the score of c 1 decreasing and nor can it result in the score of h increasing. Therefore, if W resulted in the destructive manipulation of h then so should W ′ .
⊓ ⊔
Since partial voting has no impact on destructive manipulation in rules that are monotone and are based on numerical scores, it follows that for bounded number of candidates DWCM with partial votes is in P for all of them [3] .
Corollary 4. DWCM with partial votes is in P for all scoring rules, for the maximin rule, and for Copeland α .
Theorem 12. For any positional scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to veto, DWCM in eliminate(X) with partial votes is NP-complete for three candidates.
We prove this by using a reduction from an arbitrary instance of Anti-WCM. The detailed proof can be found in the appendix.
Corollary 5. For the plurality with runoff rule, DWCM with partial votes is NP-complete for three candidates since for three candidates the plurality with runoff rule is the same as STV.
Conclusion and Future Work
Much of the earlier work in computational social choice has made the assumption that the voters specify complete preference orderings. However, there are many situations where the agents may not be willing or may simply not be able to provide this information. In this paper, we studied the problem of manipulation of weighted elections when the agents are allowed to specify partial preferences. In particular, we looked at the complexity of both constructive and destructive manipulation and we characterized the number of candidates that are required to make manipulation hard for all scoring rules, for elimination versions of all scoring rules, for the plurality with runoff rule, for a family of election systems known as Copeland α , and for the maximin protocol. These results are summarized in Table 1 . As was also noted by Narodytska and Walsh in their study of manipulation with partial votes for Borda, STV, and Copeland 0.5 [9] , there are three broad trends that we can observe. First is the case where partial voting has a strong impact on manipulation and it in turn results in a decrease in the worst-case complexity of manipulation as compared to the complete votes case. Examples of this are all the scoring rules when using the round-up evaluation scheme and the maximin rule. Second is the case where partial voting has some impact on manipulation and in fact even causes more strategic voting, but yet the worst-case complexity of manipulation remains the same as compared to the complete votes case. Some examples of voting rules which fall into this category are the Copeland α , X ↓ for any scoring rule X that is not isomorphic to plurality or veto etc. Lastly, we also see that there are voting rules for which partial voting has no impact whatsoever on strategic voting. For instance, partial voting has no impact on STV and eliminate(Veto). To facilitate easier comparison, Table 2 contains the results for the complete votes case for all the voting rules considered here. 
Plurality with runoff NP-c (3) NP-c (3)
NP-c (3) P Maximin P P 
Maximin [3] NP-c (4) P X : All scoring rules X 1 : All scoring rules except plurality & veto
All scoring rules except plurality X 3 : All scoring rules except veto
There are many possible avenues for future work. Foremost would be to look at interesting case of Copeland 1 . Although manipulation with partial votes in Copeland 1 is trivially in P for the case of three candidates, we have not been able to arrive at a result for the case when the number of candidates is greater than three. Second, throughout this paper we have assumed that the manipulators have complete information about the non-manipulators. Therefore, an interesting problem to look at would be partial voting in an incomplete information setting where the manipulators are uncertain about the non-manipulators' votes. Third, despite proving hardness of manipulation in several voting pro-tocols, a possible criticism could be that the results are in the worst-case and that we use NP-hardness -which in many cases does not necessarily reflect the actual difficulty in practice -as the complexity measure. Therefore, another interesting research direction would be to look at the average-case complexity of manipulation with partial votes, just like it has been done for the case of complete votes (for e.g. [7] , [10] , [11] ). Finally, given the fact that most of the computational social choice literature assumes complete voting, we believe that it would be worthwhile to revisit much of the work that has been done, but by now assuming partial voting. α 1 , α 2 , α 3 , where α 1 ≥ α 2 > α 3 = 0. Also, note that if the three candidates are p, a, and b, each manipulator votes in one of the following ways: (p), (p, a), (p, b) -where for (p) candidate p gets a score α 1 , a and b receive a score of (α 2 /2), and for (p, a|b) candidate p gets α 1 and a|b gets α 2 .
The proof uses a reduction from the Fixed-Difference Subset Sum problem and is very similar to the one in case iii) Theorem 3. Consider an instance of CWCM where we have (4α 1 + α 2 )K voters voting for (b, a, p), (2α 1 − α 2 )K voters voting for (a, b, p), and 2(α 1 + α 2 )K voters voting for (a, p, b). As a result, the scores of a, b, and p are (4α 1 + α 2 )(α 1 + α 2 )K, (4α 1 − α 2 )(α 1 + α 2 )K, and 2α 2 (α 1 + α 2 )K, respectively. In T, let each k i have a vote of weight 2(α 1 + α 2 )k i .
Suppose there exists S 1 , S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K. Let those manipulators who are in S 1 vote (p, b), those in S 2 vote (p, a), and let all those remaining vote (p). If x, y, and z denote the sum of the k i 's of the manipulators who vote for (p, a), (p, b), and (p), respectively, then the scores of p, a, and
, and ((4α 1 − α 2 )K + 2(yα 2 + zα 2 /2))(α 1 + α 2 ), respectively. Now if there existed a manipulation, then the score of p has to be at least as large as that of a and b. Let us consider p and a first. Whatever follows can be replicated for b. Suppose
Simplifying this we have, 2x + z ≤ K. But since y − x = K and x + y + z = 2K, we know that 2x + z = K, and hence our assumption that s(p) ≥ s(a) is true. Doing the same with respect to p and b, we will see that s(p) = s(b). As a result, we can conclude that existence of S 1 , S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K results in a successful manipulation for p.
Conversely, suppose there exists a manipulation in favor of p. This implies that the score of p is at least as much as that of a, and from above we know that this in turn results in the inequality 2x + z ≤ K (1). Similarly, comparing p and b we have, 2y + z ≤ 3K (2). Now, using the fact that x + y + z = 2K, we know that inequality (1) reduces to y − x ≥ K and inequality (2) reduces to y − x ≤ K. But then, y − x cannot be both greater and lesser than equal to K at the same time. So y − x has to be equal to K, and this in turn implies that there exists two sets S 1 , S 2 such that S 1 − S 2 = K, where y = S 1 and x = S 2 .
⊓ ⊔ , where a, b, and h are the three candidates, and h is the disliked candidate. In the DWCM instance we construct, we use the same set of candidates, the same set of manipulators T , and to the S from the Anti-WCM instance we add the following set S ′ of votes such that K is greater than the sum of the weights in S and T combined. We set h to be the disliked candidate in the DWCM instance.
Suppose there was a way to make h receive the lowest score in the Anti-WCM instance. If score S (a) denotes the score candidate a receives from S, then this implies that score S∪T (a) > score S∪T (h), and score S∪T (b) > score S∪T (h). Also, note that all the three candidates a, b, and h are tied in S ′ as each of them receive a score of 4α 1 K + 2α 2 K. This in turn implies that h receives the lowest score in the DWCM instance, and so will be eliminated in the first round. Thus, existence of a successful manipulation in the Anti-WCM instance ensures the existence of a successful manipulation in the DWCM instance.
Conversely, suppose there exists a successful destructive manipulation against h in the DWCM instance. We first show that this is possible only if h is eliminated in the first round in eliminate(X). To do so, let us assume it were not the case and that one of a or b was eliminated in the first round. Let us consider a first. If a was eliminated in the first round then the votes in S ′ would now be: Since the elimination of a means that they are only two candidates remaining, from now on we can assume our protocol to be equivalent to plurality (since any scoring rule is equivalent to plurality when there are only two candidates). So now, score S ′ (h) − score S ′ (b) = K and since K is greater than sum of the weights in S and T combined this implies that in the subsequent round b will be eliminated, thus resulting in h winning the DWCM instance. Therefore, there cannot be a destructive manipulation against h in the DWCM instance if a is eliminated in the first round. Similarly, by doing things identically for candidate b, we can see that a destructive manipulation against h will not be possible if b is eliminated in the first round. This in turn leads us to conclude that a successful destructive manipulation against h is possible only if h is eliminated in the first round. But then, since all the three candidates are tied in S ′ , the only way this can happen is if h receives the lowest score in S. Or in other words, a successful destructive manipulation against h in the DWCM instance is possible only if there exists a successful manipulation against h in the Anti-WCM instance. ⊓ ⊔
